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Using Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence With a
Self-Defense Strategy in Minnesota
Kent M. Williams*
On March 5, 1942, Hastings, Minnesota police arrested Regina
Schabert for killing her husband.'
The previous morning, Frank Schabert had refused to go to
work and demanded five dollars "to go out and get drunk." Re-
gina gave her husband two dollars and did not see him again until
he returned home at eight o'clock that evening.2
When he arrived home, Frank refused to eat the dinner Re-
gina laid out for him and insisted that the two visit some saloons.
Regina put their child to bed and accompanied Frank to several
taverns. After drinking whiskey for a number of hours, Frank be-
came so intoxicated that Regina took the car keys from him and
drove them home herself. During the trip Frank slapped Regina
on the head and arms 3 while at the same time pulling on the hand
throttle, making the car speed up and causing a minor traffic
accident.4
Once home Frank continued to beat Regina. She eventually
escaped and carried her sleeping child to a neighbor's house, where
she telephoned the police. The police arrived and put Frank in a
squad car, but released him when he promised to "behave him-
self." When the police left Frank became enraged, threatening to
kill Regina and attacking her with a chair.5 Regina eluded her
* Kent M. Williams received a B.A. from the University of Minnesota in 1987
and a J.D. from the University of Minnesota Law School in 1991. He currently
practices law in Minneapolis. This article was written as an independent study pro-
ject under Professor Beverly Balos and was awarded the Minnesota Women Law-
yers 1991 Equal Justice Award. The author is grateful to Professor Balos for
providing invaluable research direction and editorial comments and is honored to
have been chosen by Minnesota Women Lawyers for its prestigious award.
1. State v. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d 585, 586 (Minn. 1944) [hereinafter Schabert I].
2. Id.
3. Frank frequently beat Regina during their five-year marriage. Id. This fact
was corroborated by several witnesses at Regina Schabert's second trial. Record at
425-26, 428, 456-58, 486-87, 612, 626, State v. Schabert, 24 N.W.2d 846 (Minn. 1946)
[hereinafter Schabert II].
4. Schabert I, 15 N.W.2d at 586.
5. Id.
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husband, however, and shot him with a shotgun, killing him.6 She
then went to her mother's house and, on her mother's advice,
turned herself in to the police.7
At trial, defense counsel presented evidence that Regina was
"feeble-minded"s and argued that she did not have the mental ca-
pacity to formulate a criminal intent.9 Alternatively, defense
counsel argued that Regina had acted in self-defense.10 The jury
rejected both arguments and found Regina Schabert guilty of first-
degree murder. She was sentenced to life imprisonment."ll 2
At the time Regina Schabert stood trial for murdering her
husband, social scientists knew little about the causes and effects
of domestic violence against women. In the 1970s social scientists
began to focus their research on the plight of battered women.
Minnesota courts now allow battered women accused of killing
their abusers to use this research to help explain their actions.
This paper surveys domestic violence research and discusses how
theories about battered women might be used in Minnesota courts
to defend a woman accused of killing her abuser. Part I surveys
the contemporary research and theory regarding a battered wo-
man's behavior and focuses on theories explaining why a battered
woman might respond to her abuse by killing the abuser. Part II
evaluates various theories that might be used in Minnesota to de-
fend a battered woman charged with killing her abuser, concludes
that self-defense is the best defense strategy, and discusses eviden-
tiary issues relevant to a battered woman's self-defense claim.
I. The Battered Woman Syndrome and Other Theories
Wife beating has existed for centuries and can be seen as a
reflection of western society's patriarchal orientation.' 3 Early ac-
6. There was some confusion as to whether Regina shot Frank accidentally
during a struggle over the gun, or as he lay asleep on the bed. Compare id. at 586-
87 with Schabert II, 24 N.W.2d at 848.
7. Schabert I, 15 N.W.2d at 587.
8. Id. at 586.
9. Appellant's Brief at 46-49, 54, Schabert I (No. 33714).
10. Id. at 49-51, 55.
11. Id. at 2. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed Regina Schabert's convic-
tion and remanded for a new trial on the ground that the trial court had improp-
erly admitted a coerced confession into evidence. Schabert I, 15 N.W.2d at 588, 589.
After a second trial, the court upheld her conviction for second-degree murder and
sentence of life imprisonment. Schabert II, 24 N.W.2d at 850.
12. See Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet" The Battered Woman
Syndrome, Sef-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REV. 545, 547 (1988);
Mira Mihajlovich, Note, Does Plight Make Right The Battered Woman Syndrome,
Expert Testimony and the Law of Sef-Defense, 62 Ind. L.J. 1253, 1254 (1987).
13. Mather, supra note 12, at 547 & nn.10-13.
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ceptance of violence toward women appears in Greek myths and
Biblical passages. 14 In the Middle Ages, wife beating was not only
tolerated, but encouraged. 15 The English common law and the Na-
poleonic Civil Code continued this practice.16 In the United States,
wife beating was acceptable in many state legal systems until the
mid-20th century.1 7 Even after state courts no longer expressly
condoned marital violence, government authorities and health pro-
fessionals "systematically ignored" domestic violence toward
women.S
As the feminist movement gained momentum in the 1960s
and 1970s, the problem of domestic violence began to receive more
attention.' 9 After the first shelter for battered women opened in
1971, some health professionals began to focus their study on do-
mestic violence toward women.20 By the end of the decade, Dr.
Lenore Walker, a clinical psychologist, had reported several com-
mon characteristics among female victims of domestic violence.
21
14. Id. at 547 & n.14.
15. Id. at 547-48 & nn.15-16.
16. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Wolfe, 198 S.E. 209, 213 (W. Va. 1938). The Wolfe court
noted that although "the common law right of a husband to chastise his wife is not
recognized in [West Virginia] ... 'courts generally recognize that provocation given
by the complaining spouse is always a material matter for consideration.' "Id. (cita-
tions omitted). The court held that because the plaintiff had refused to allow her
abusive husband to see their child, she had "provoked" him, and his subsequent
beating of her did not constitute sufficient grounds for divorce. Id. See also
Mather, supra note 12, at 548 & n.17 (citing several United States cases excusing
abusive behavior by men against women).
17. See Mihajlovich, supra note 12, at 1254-55 & nn.11-12. This apparently was
a reflection of society's continuing acceptance of domestic violence. Among other
things, the author recounts a 1971 psychological study describing a relative reluc-
tance of male subjects to intervene in "male-upon-female" physical abuse. Id. at
1255 n.12. According to the author, "[olne reason posited for the unresponsiveness
of males in situations of male-upon-female violence is the assumption that the man
was the woman's husband, and she somehow deserved the violence." Id. (citation
omitted).
The record in Schabert II reveals that several of Regina Schabert's friends and
her family, were well-aware that she was beaten regularly by Frank. Record at
425-26, 428, 456-57, 486.
18. See Mihajlovich, supra note 12, at 1254.
19. See Mather, supra note 12, at 548 & nn.20-22 (citing in particular ERIN PIZ-
ZEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR (1974)). Mather notes that
"[t]he battered woman's movement really did not achieve momentum in the United
States until the mid-1970s when the National Organization for Women established
a Task Force on Battered Women and Household Violence, and shelters and coali-
tions began springing up across the country." Id. at 548 (citation omitted).
20. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979). THE BATTERED
WOMAN was based on preliminary research conducted by Dr. Walker during a
three-year study of domestic violence.
21. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984), in
which Dr. Walker provided more extensive findings and analysis in her final
report.
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Based on her observations, Walker theorized that female domestic
violence victims suffered from a mental disorder she called "bat-
tered woman syndrome."2 2 Although Walker's research is the
most commonly accepted explanation for the responses of battered
women to abuse, another approach worth noting derives from fem-
inist theory. This theory focuses on society's ills rather than indi-
vidual behavior. Each approach is looked at more closely below.
A. The Battered Woman Syndrome
Battered woman syndrome, often described as a type of post-
traumatic stress disorder,23 is a set of psychological and behavioral
reactions displayed by women who are subjected to severe, long-
term domestic abuse.24 Walker defines a "battered woman" as "a
woman, 18 years of age or over, who is or has been in an intimate
relationship with a man who repeatedly subjects or subjected her
to forceful physical and/or psychological abuse."25 The "abuse" el-
ement includes such behavior as excessive jealousy, extreme ver-
bal harassment, restriction of activity, nonverbal or verbal threats
of punishment, sexual assault, and physical attack.26 As the defini-
tion indicates, a woman need not be physically injured by the bat-
terer,27 although some sort of physical abuse usually accompanies
the psychological harm inflicted.28
In her three-year study, Walker examined 400 women who
22. See, e.g., Sarah C. Madison, Comment, A Critique and Proposed Solution to
the Adverse Examination Problem Raised by Battered Woman Syndrome Testi-
mony in State v. Hennum, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1023, 1028 & n.23 (1990) (citing court
cases classifying the syndrome as a sub-category of post-traumatic stress disorder).
23. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 7-13 (providing an overview of the
syndrome).
24. Id. at 203.
25. Id. An "intimate" relationship is one "having a romantic, affectionate, or
sexual component." Id. Although most battered women in the study reported
more than four battering incidents, "repeatedly" means simply more than once. Id.
26. Most other researchers define a battered woman similarly. See, e.g., Mary
A. Douglas, The Battered Woman Syndrome, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 39,
39 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed. 1987) (defining a battered woman as "[a] woman who has
been the victim of physical, sexual, and/or psychological abuse by her partner").
27. WALKER, supra note 21, at 27 (recognizing that "[t]he physically abusive in-
cidents [studied] were so compelling and overwhelming in the amount of overt vio-
lent behavior that the psychological components got less attention").
28. Id. at 204-05. The 400 women in Dr. Walker's study constituted a non-ran-
domized, self-selected sample taken from Colorado, Montana, South Dakota, North
Dakota, Wyoming, and Utah. The sample included women from urban, suburban,
rural and mountain areas, as well as various racial groups. The sample also in-
cluded women who had killed their abusers, were separated from their abusers, or
were still in the abusive relationship. As the data collection phase of the study
progressed, additional efforts were made to obtain as wide a representation as possi-
ble. Id.
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met the above criteria.2 9 The study revealed that battered women
tend to share several common characteristics, including low self-
esteem, a traditional upbringing, stereotypical beliefs about marital
roles, and severe stress reactions.30 A battered woman is also
likely to have been raised in a home where family members were
subjected to domestic abuse31 Battered women often blame them-
selves for the battering, believe that only they can resolve their
problems, and deny feeling fear or anger about the situation.3 2
Battered women also attempt to manipulate the domestic environ-
ment to avoid further abuse, and may rely on sex to maintain inti-
macy with the batterer.33
Walker identified a three-phase "cycle of violence" that re-
peats itself throughout the battering relationship.34 During the
"tension building" phase, tension gradually escalates in the rela-
tionship as the woman is subjected to name-calling, other mean-
spirited psychological abuse, and/or physical abuse.35 Phase two,
the "acute battering incident," is "the uncontrollable discharge of
the tensions that have built up during phase one."' S At this time
the batterer subjects the woman to an onslaught of psychological
and physical punishment that may leave the woman severely
shaken and/or injured.37 Phase three, "loving contrition," is char-
acterized by the batterer's kindness toward the woman and re-
29. WALKER, supra note 20, at 31; WALKER, supra note 21, at 18.
30. WALKER, supra note 21, at 19. Between the woman and the abuser, the
abuser is more likely to have been raised in a violent household. Id.
31. Id. at 31. See also LEE HOFF, BArrERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS 46-49 (1990);
Dee L. R. Graham, Edna Rawlings, & Nelly Rimini, Survivors of Terror: Battered
Women, Hostages and the Stockholm Syndrome, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
WIFE ABUSE 217 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds. 1988) [hereinafter FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES] (noting that because the woman must anticipate the abuser's every
move to survive, she tends to over-sympathize with his actions).
32. WALKER, supra note 20, at 31.
33. WALKER, supra note 21, at 95.
34. Id. The woman attempts to placate the batterer by accepting his criticism
and often blames herself if she is unable to soothe him. The tension continues to
escalate to the point where the woman withdraws from the batterer, wary of set-
ting off an explosion of violence. Sometimes the woman is even able to predict
when the next phase will begin, and accordingly takes precautions to minimize the
extent of her injuries by controlling when and where the battering occurs. Id. at
96.
35. Id. (citing WALKER, supra note 20, at 59).
36. Id. Walker notes that "[wihen injuries do occur it [sic] usually happens dur-
ing this second phase. It is also the time police become involved, if they are called
at all. The acute battering phase is concluded when the battering stops, usually
bringing with its cessation a sharp physiological reduction in tension." Id.
37. Id. The batterer "may apologize profusely, try to assist his victim ... and
shower her with gifts and/or promises." Id. Walker further observed, however,
that the last phase may include no loving-contrition behavior, but simply an ab-
sence of tension or violence. Id.
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morse about the battering incident.38 The third phase provides the
woman with positive reinforcement for staying in the
relationship.3 9
As the relationship progresses, the tension building phase
grows more common, while the intensity of the last phase de-
clines.4o Also, the psychological and/or physical abuse in phase
two increases in severity over time.41 The cycle is likely to recur
until the woman seeks outside intervention 42 or the relationship
ends.
Although a battered woman may seek outside help as the
abuse escalates, many women find it difficult to seek such help or
abandon the abusive relationship. 43 Walker's and other studies in-
dicate that social isolation,44 lack of financial resources, 45 concern
for children left behind,46 and ineffective community response47
may contribute to a battered woman's reluctance to leave her
abuser. While recognizing the effect of these external forces,48
38. Id. Walker notes that "[t]he woman wants to believe the batterer and, early
in the relationship at least, may renew her hope in his ability to change." Id.
Walker further observes that phase three is positively reinforcing even if character-
ized solely by an absence of tension or violence, rather than extraordinary efforts at
reconciliation. Id.
39. Id. at 101.
40. Id. at 26 (noting that "about double the number of women receiv[e] serious
injuries in later incidents," and that "[tihe use of weapons also increased over
time").
41. Id. at 103. Walker cites a 1983 study by R. J. Gelles indicating that "[o]nce
the cost of living in a violent relationship begins to escalate, paralleling the escala-
tion of the seriousness of the abusiveness and injuries, women's help-seeking be-
havior breaks through the privacy of the home, if they perceive actual help is
available." Id. This conclusion comports with Walker's data: she observed that
"[wihile only 14% sought help after the first battering incident ... 49% sought help
after the [fourth] incident." Id. at 26.
42. See generally id. at 86-94 (theorizing why some women leave the relation-
ship, and others remain).
43. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 28; DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIvES at 81-82
(1981); Rae Randolph, The Diminished Capacity Defense of Battered Women: An
Alternative Political Approach, 70(4) WOMEN LAWYERS J. 24-25 (1983); Lillian Rog-
ers, Theories of Deviance in Explanations of Spouse Abuse, 11(2) RESPONSE TO THE
VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 10, 12 (1988); Mather, supra note 12, at
552.
44. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 28; MARTIN, supra note 43, at 83-85; Mather,
supra note 12, at 552.
45. Mather, supra note 12, at 552; HOFF, supra note 31, at 64.
46. See Douglas J. Besharov, Family Violence: Research and Public Policy Is-
sues for the '90s, 13(1) RESPONSE TO THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 6
(1990); Demie Kurz & Evan Stark, Not-So-Benign Neglect: The Medical Response to
Battering, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 31, at 249, 259-60.
47. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 28, 89, 117-19.
48. Id. at 86-87. Dr. Walker analogizes her theory to a study conducted by Dr.
M. Seligman in the 1970s. The Seligman study revealed that when laboratory dogs
were repeatedly and noncontingently shocked, they became unable to escape, even
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Walker offered a psychological explanation, "learned helpless-
ness," for the apparent inability of some women to leave.49 As a
battered woman continues to experience abuse regardless of her
attempts to prevent it,50 she becomes pessimistic about the likeli-
hood of ending the abuse, grows increasingly depressed, and even-
tually loses her will to escape.5 1 This psychological response warps
the battered woman's evaluation of the situation and effectively
imprisons her in the abusive relationship,5 2 as she shifts her focus
solely to a survival strategy rather than attempting to end or es-
cape the abuse.53
Walker's work was a milestone in the study of domestic vio-
lence toward women, and her theories regarding battered woman
syndrome remain the most well-accepted explanation for battered
when an escape route was made obvious. Seligman compared this phenomenon,
which he called "learned helplessness," to human depression. He concluded that
"[tlhe inability to predict the success of one's actions was ... responsible for the
resulting perceptual distortions." Id. at 86.
49. See id. at 87 (referring to a battered woman's "noncontingent... attempts
to control the violence").
50. Id. at 87-89. Walker tested her theory by comparing women who had left
their abusers ("outs") with women who had remained in their relationships since
the last battering incident ("ins"). She found that the "outs" displayed a signifi-
cantly greater level of "active" emotions like anger, disgust, and hostility toward
themselves and their abusers. The "ins," however, displayed more "passive" emo-
tions, and were generally more fearful, anxious, and depressed about their situa-
tions. Id. at 87-89. Walker found this data consistent with the "learned
helplessness" theory. Id. at 89. The notion that fear plays a large part in a wo-
man's decision to stay in an abusive relationship has been explored by other re-
searchers as well. See MARTIN, supra note 43, at 76-79; Mather, supra note 12, at
554-55.
Walker found that women who had been socialized to be passive in childhood
were more likely to develop learned helplessness in a battering relationship.
WALKER, supra note 21, at 94. The data revealed that women currently in abusive
relationships "report[ed] worse... childhoods and generally did not see themselves
as victims of learned helplessness." Id. Walker theorized that childhood passivity
"training" prepared these women for learned helplessness, and that as a result
"either their battering experiences were not as severe or they do not yet see them
as so severe." Id. Subsequent research supports the notion that women taught to
be passive as children are more likely remain in abusive relationships as adults.
See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 43, at 10.
51. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 87.
52. Id. at 33. Dr. Walker maintains that "[i]f a woman is to escape such a rela-
tionship, she must overcome the tendency to rely on learned helplessness survival
techniques." Id. at 87.
Feminist scholars, while agreeing that battered women often resort to survival
techniques rather than leave the abuser, object to the term "helpless" to describe
battered women. They argue that the term does not accurately reflect the woman's
behavior, nor her role in the relationship. Moreover, they maintain that the word
furthers unfavorable stereotypes about women in general and battered women in
particular. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
53. See Michele Bograd, An Introduction, in FEMINIST PERSPECTWVES, supra
note 31, at 11, 13.
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women's psychological and behavioral responses to domestic abuse.
Feminist scholars, however, have offered a somewhat broader, so-
cietal explanation. Their theory incorporates much of Walker's
conception, but places it in a larger social context.
B. Women as Survivors.
While acknowledging the strength of Walker's research and
theories, some feminist theorists focus more closely on the context
of the violence, its nature and consequences, family members'
roles, and the different "transactional sequences" that result in
abuse.5 4 In particular, these theorists stress the role gender differ-
ences play in the domestic abuse of women.55 General patterns of
gender-based domination, social dynamics within the family, the
need to evaluate battered women's role from a female perspective,
and reassessment of existing theories under a rubric of "feminist
scholarship" are the main areas emphasized.
1. General patterns of gender-based domination
As discussed above,56 most western societies have historically
encouraged domestic violence toward women.5 7 Besides failing to
provide a legal remedy for women who were physically abused by
their spouses, these societies greatly restricted the rights of women
to exercise political power, to hold and transfer property, or to en-
joy other minimal liberties now regarded as essential for self-de-
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
56. See R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The 'Appropriate' Vic-
tims of Marital Violence, 2 VICrIMOLOGY 426-32 (1978) (discussing historical accept-
ance of domestic violence toward women).
57. Id. at 427-28. The Dobashes note that under the first Roman law of
marriage:
married women were "to conform themselves entirely to the temper
of their husbands and the husbands to rule their wives as necessary
and inseparable possessions".... The man was the absolute patriarch
who owned and controlled all properties and people within the family.
A wife was obligated to obey her husband and he was given the legal
right and the moral obligation to control and punish her for any "mis-
behavior," including adultery, drinking wine, attending public games
without his permission or appearing unveiled in public.
Id. (citation omitted). Tracing the influx of Christianity, the Dobashes reveal that
although Christians desired religious change, "[they were] not struggling for revolu-
tionary change but the maintenance of the power and authority of the patriarch.
Christianity embraced the hierarchical family structure and celebrated the subordi-
nation of wives to their husbands." Id. at 428. With the rise of the western societies
in Europe, the Church maintained this hierarchy "through a moral order and the
State through actively propagandizing for the authority of husbands and legitimiz-
ing the use of violence against their wives." Id. at 429. In Great Britain, "[u]nder
English Common Law a married woman lost all of her civil rights, had no separate
legal status and became the legal chattel of her husband." Id.
[Vol. 10:107
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termination.58 Although women have more rights today than they
did previously, many social and political observers note that men
still enjoy substantially more political and economic power than
women. 59
Feminist scholars insist that a complete explanation of do-
mestic abuse must include the socio-historical context in which it
occurs - a system wherein men as a group wield substantial con-
trol over women. In such a social system, men maintain access to
political and economic resources "while women are devalued as
secondary and inferior."60 Physical violence is a primary means
for maintaining this control. Even if men do not rely on actual vi-
olence in particular situations, the mere threat of male violence re-
inforces women's passivity and subordination to male aggression. 61
Thus, social domination "is the most crucial factor contributing to
and maintaining wife abuse at the personal level."6 2
2. Social dynamics within the family
The "typical" family home traditionally has been represented
as a "peaceful haven in a heartless world" in the male-dominated
public realm.63 Data collected in crime surveys indicate that a vic-
tim of violent crime is most likely to be a young, single, minority
man, living in an urban area, who is attacked outside his home.64
Thus, when discussing the general "fear of crime," criminologists
and policymakers focus on violent crime randomly committed by
strangers.65 Using gender-neutral terminology, these researchers
essentially view the home as a "safety zone" and do not attribute
58. See Bograd, supra note 53, at 14 (recognizing that "[a]s the dominant class,
men have differential access to important material and symbolic resources"); Ran-
dolph, supra note 43, at 24 (noting that men as a group have greater political power
than women); Mather, supra note 12, at 569-74 (arguing that legal standards like
the "reasonable force" requirement for self-defense are written from a male view-
point and imposed upon women).
59. Bograd, supra note 53, at 14.
60. See id. (reasoning that "[e]ven if individual men refrain from employing
physical force against their partners, men as a class benefit from how women's lives
are restricted and limited because of their fear of violence by husbands and lovers
as well as by strangers"). See also Elizabeth A. Stanko, Fear of Crime and the
Myth of the Safe Home: A Feminist Critique of Criminology, in FEMINIST PER-
SPECTIVES, supra note 31, at 75, 84 (concluding that "women's vulnerability [to vio-
lent attacks by men]--and women's recognition of that vulnerability through
expressions of fear-is itself a mechanism of social control over women").
61. Bograd, supra note 53, at 14.
62. See Stanko, supra note 60, at 76 (observing that "[t]he myth of the safe
home is deeply entrenched in the minds of most Americans").
63. Id. at 81.
64. Id. at 78.
65. Id.
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the fear of violent crime to domestic violence.6
Although the male perspective supports the notion that a
general* fear of violent crime is attributable to "unsafe streets,"
this perspective ignores the female experience. Crime data indi-
cate that a woman is more likely to be killed near or inside her
home by another family member than on the street by a stran-
ger.6 7 Other physical attacks like assaults and rapes also com-
monly take place within the home.88 Any suggestion, however,
that the home may be a dangerous place for women, is rejected be-
cause it "confronts deeply ingrained and hostile beliefs that sup-
port the ideology of the home as man's haven."69
Feminist scholars challenge the myth of the home as a haven
and steer the debate away from its current focus on "unsafe
streets" toward a greater emphasis on "unsafe homes."70 They
question the maintenance of traditional gender-based roles in the
family unit 7 ' and re-conceptualize the unit as an institution that
contributes to family violence.72 These scholars further note that
women are not likely to overcome their general fear of crime, es-
pecially from unknown men, as long as they are victimized in their
own homes by men familiar to them.7 3
3. Evaluating the battered women's role from a female
perspective
As described above, Walker theorizes that battered women
eventually enter a condition of "learned helplessness" in which
their pessimism and depression becomes so profound that they are
unable to escape the abuse by leaving the abuser. Walker further
postulates that women adjust their efforts to surviving the abuse,
rather than escaping it.74 She argues that a battered woman must
overcome learned helplessness to take constructive steps toward
ending the abuse.75
Some theorists criticize the use of the term "helpless" to de-
66. Id. at 82.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 86.
69. Id. at 83 (criticizing the United States Attorney General's Task Force on
Family Violence for not "tak[ing] on the myth of the safe home").
70. See HowF, supra note 31, at 38-46 (theorizing that a woman stays in an abu-
sive relationship in compliance with a complex set of multiple-reinforcing factors
that vests her spouse with authority and influence socially, and threatens the wo-
man physically).
71. Stanko, supra note 60, at 82-83.
72. Id. at 86.
73. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
75. Id.
Vol. 10:107
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scribe women. They argue that the term is relevant only when
judging human behavior from a male perspective, without regard
to a "female frame of reference"76 in which women define their
own experiences. 77 These theorists view the term as not only inac-
curate from the female perspective, but counter-productive, rein-
forcing the stereotype of women as passive and weak.78 The
notion that the battered woman must overcome this condition to
escape the abuse is also seen as unsatisfactory, as it effectively
makes the woman responsible for ending the abuse, rather than
the abuser or the community. 79
The survival aspect of the woman's behavior is emphasized in
a general effort to redefine much of the debate to reflect the fe-
male perspective.8 0 Under this approach, "[i]n contrast to domi-
nant views of battered women as helpless victims . . . feminists
approach battered women as survivors of harrowing, life-threaten-
ing experiences, who have many adaptive capacities and
strengths."8l Thus, actions that might be characterized as mani-
festing "learned helplessness" are re-cast as part of an overall sur-
vival strategy.8 2
4. Feminist scholarship
The fourth aspect of this approach is remedial: as the above
discussion might indicate, the need for "feminist" research regard-
ing battered women is recognized. Feminist scholars view their re-
search as not only concerning women, but "dedicated to advocacy
for women."8 3 The woman's role in the abuse is not merely incor-
porated into existing theoretical contexts,8 4 but the theories them-
76. Bograd, supra note 53, at 15.
77. See generally Liz Kelly, How Women Define Their Experiences of Violence,
in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 31, at 114. Kelly criticizes traditional defini-
tions relating to domestic violence as drawn from stereotypes, id. at 122-24, and
calls for a process of redefinition to reflect the female perspective. Id. at 128-31.
78. EDWARD W. GoNDoLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATrERED WOMEN AS SURVI-
voRs: AN ALTERNATIVE To TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 14-20 (1988) (main-
taining that labelling a woman as "helpless" reinforces sexist stereotypes and
borders on victim-blaming).
79. See, e.g., Kurz & Stark, supra note 46, at 249 (arguing that labelling women
as "helpless victims" detracts from the inadequacy of community services).
80. See generally GoNDoLF & FISHER, supra note 78 (proposing a shift in em-
phasis to women as survivors, rather than as helpless victims).
81. Bograd, supra note 53, at 15.
82. See Kelly, supra note 77, at 124-28 (theorizing that "learned helplessness"
behavior such as "forgetting" and "minimizing" is but one phase in an "active cop-
ing strategy").
83. Bograd, supra note 53, at 15 (emphasis in original).
84. Many theorists have recognized that supposedly "objective" research and
theories are riddled with biases that favor the dominant male viewpoint. See, e.g.,
Lee A. Hoff, Collaborative Feminist Research and the Myth of Objectivity, in FEMI-
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selves are re-drawn from a female perspective.8 5 This is viewed as
crucial not only to overcoming the devaluation of women in soci-
ety, but to accurately explain both male and female perceptions
and behavior.8 6
C. Psychological Explanations for Why a Battered
Woman May Respond by Killing Her Abuser
As discussed above, Walker presents a complex set of psycho-
logical phenomena to explain why battered women remain in a
battering relationship.8 7 She further reveals factors that may re-
sult in the woman killing the abuser, and theorizes that women
kill their abusers when they perceive "a high level of dangerous-
ness" in the abuser while feeling desperate, fearful, or angry.88
Other researchers have offered additional theories in an attempt
to explain why some battered women respond to abuse by killing
their abusers.8 9
1. Walker's theory
Walker suggests that women kill their abusers out of a mix-
ture of intense frustration and fear. In her study,9 0 most of the
women did not believe anyone took them seriously, were con-
vinced that no one would protect them from the abuser, and had
determined from "observable changes" in the abusers' demeanor
NIST PERSPECTIVES, sup a note 31, at 269, 272. Hoff does not claim that feminist
research is objective; rather, she proposes that regardless of the values underpin-
ning the research, the values be made explicit in all cases. Id. See also James
Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVwS, supra note
31, at 133, 135-41 (explaining his political motivation for conducting a study on abus-
ers, recognizing the potential for bias in all "objective" research, and explaining his
attempts to limit the effect of bias in the study).
Ironically, when feminist scholars openly acknowledge their political motiva-
tions for conducting research, they are criticized as biased or overly political. See
Bograd, supra note 53, at 21.
85. Bograd, supra note 53, at 15-16.
86. Id. at 16. See, e.g., Susan Schecter, Building Bridges Between Activists, Pro-
fessionakls, and Researchers, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 31, at 299, 300.
Schecter criticizes the use of the phrase "spouse abuse" as representing a "false no-
tion of equality [that] men (are] the victims of violence as frequently as women
[are]." She admits that women may hit men in some cases, but adds that "the expe-
rience of violence is usually not the same for both sexes." She reasons that because
"battering is a pattern of coercive control over women" within "relationship of
domination," it follows that "battering is not a gender-neutral experience." Id.
87. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text (discussing external and inter-
nal factors that trap battered women in abusive relationships).
88. WALKER, supra note 21, at 41.
89. See infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
90. Walker examined 50 women who had killed their abusers in self-defense.
WALKER, supra note 21, at 40.
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that the men intended to kill them.91 Although they felt intense
anger before attacking, most of the women had little recollection
of how they reached their decision to kill the abuser, other than
recalling "an intense focus on their own survival." 92 Other women
attacked their abusers in a "desperate attempt to keep [the abuser]
from gaining total control of their minds" as well as their bodies.9
3
Overall, Walker's data suggest that the women "all resorted to
[physical] violence as their last attempt at protecting themselves
from further physical and mental harm." 94
Besides hypothesizing why some women kill their abusers,
Walker notes several factors that increase the risk of a woman re-
sponding violently. The presence of children in the home exacer-
bates stress and increases the chances of a violent response,
especially if the children themselves are threatened by the
abuser.95 The abuser's threats to kill the woman, or to find her if
she leaves, increase her fear of a deadly attack and similarly in-
crease the risk of a violent response.96 Other factors include the
presence of weapons in the home, the woman's jealousy triggered
by the abuser's open extra-marital affairs, and alcohol or drug
abuse by the abuser.97 Finally, it appears that a deadly response
by the woman is more likely to occur later in the relationship,
91. Id. See also People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (cit-
ing testimony by Walker that battered women have a "hypervigilence [sic] to cues
of any kind of impending violence... [that makes them] more responsive to situa-
tions than somebody who has not been battered").
92. WALKER, supra note 21, at 40. Walker maintains that their defenses against
anger were crumbling, but the women had no conscious recollection of angry feel-
ings. She attributes this "desperate attempt at remaining unaware of their own un-
acceptable feelings" to the dangerousness of the situation: displaying anger would
possibly result in their own deaths, as "batterers cannot tolerate the woman's ex-
pression of anger." Id. Note, for example, that several deputies testified that Re-
gina Schabert appeared disoriented for days after the shooting. Record at 23, 76, 91-
92, 217, Schabert II.
Other researchers include a larger feminist perspective in suggesting that an-
ger leads to a deadly response by the woman. See, e.g., Randolph, supra note 43, at
25, 26-27 (suggesting that when women "become aware of the repressive nature of
(their] lifestyle[s]" they may "become so stressful and angered at their situations
that they find no other alternative than to strike back"). Id.
93. WALKER, supra note 21, at 41.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 41. This factor includes situations in which the children are attempt-
ing to protect their mother from the abuser, or the woman is attempting to protect
her children. Id. See, e.g., 48 Hour" 'Til Death Do Us Part (CBS television broad-
cast Jan. 30, 1990) (presenting the case of Linda Logan, who fatally shot her hus-
band as he was attacking their child). Regina Schabert ran from her husband to a
neighbor's house with her child. Schabert 1, 15 N.W.2d at 586.
96. WALKER, supra note 21, at 41-42. Regina Schabert testified that her hus-
band threatened to kill her the night she shot him. Schabert I, 15 N.W.2d at 586.
97. WALKER, supra note 21, at 42-43. See also Schabert I, 15 N.W.2d at 586.
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when the severity of abuse escalates. 98
2. Other theories
Other scientists have further explored the phenomena ob-
served by Walker. One theory examines more closely the woman's
fear of psychological harm, or "ontological insecurity."99 This ap-
proach focuses on the severe psychological torment many battered
women suffer at the hands of their abusers.100 The theory further
recognizes that many women are unable to leave or seek outside
intervention due to external barriers' 0 ' and psychological forces
that bind the women to their abusers.102
Trapped in the relationship, these women attempt to pre-
serve their psychological selves by denying or rationalizing their
situations.' 0 3 As the battering relationship continues, the women
eventually reach a "turning point"104 when their psychological de-
fenses disintegrate and "the self is left without a reality base, in a
crisis of ambiguity."'105 In such a state, the women are forced to
98. WALKER, supra note 21, at 43-44.
99. See CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 63-66 (1987). Ewing
argues that women kill their abusers not out of fear of severe physical harm, but
out of fear of severe psychological harm, or "ontological insecurity." According to
Ewing and others, ontologically secure people see their lives as continuous, and per-
ceive themselves as clearly differentiated and autonomous. Ontologically insecure
people, however, "[f]eel more unreal than real . . . more dead than alive." Their
"identity and autonomy are always in question," they are unable to perceive them-
selves as "genuine, good [or] valuable," and they become "preoccupied with preserv-
ing rather than gratifying themselves." Unchecked, ontological insecurity leads to
an increasingly withdrawn, schizoid existence in which the individual becomes un-
able to relate to others in any meaningful fashion. Id. at 63-64 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 13-17 (observing that "[b]attered women often face formidable, if not
insurmountable environmental barriers to leaving their batterers or even seeking
help," including the batterer himself, lack of money, social isolation, insufficient
community resources, an ambivalent criminal justice system, and ineffective medi-
cal and psychiatric care).
102. Id. at 17-21 (noting that ingrained sex role stereotypes, the cycle of violence,
the "traumatic bond" battered women develop with their abusers, learned helpless-
ness, and intense depression combine to discourage escape attempts). Other studies
have also focused on the "traumatic bond" that develops between the battered wo-
man and the batterer. See, e.g., Graham, Rawlings, and Rimini, supra note 31, at
218 (suggesting that battered women remain with their abusers due to a set of "par-
adoxical psychological responses" observed among hostages who develop a fondness
for their captors and a hostility toward authorities working for their release).
103. EWING, supra note 99, at 64.
104. This turning point can be precipitated by any of a number of events, includ-
ing a marked increase in the severity of the abuse, questioning by persons outside
the relationship to whom the abuse has become visible, or disappearance of the
"loving contrition" phase of the cycle of violence. Id. at 65.
105. Id. (quoting John M. Johnson & Kathleen J. Ferraro, The Victimized Self.
The Case of the Battered Woman, in THE EXISTENTIAL SELF IN SOCIETY 118, 127
(Joseph A. Kotarba & Andrea Fontana eds. 1984)).
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take immediate steps to end the abuse and prevent the "antici-
pated breakup of the self."'106 Forced into a "choice" between stay-
ing with their abusers and suffering devastating psychological
consequences, or preserving their psychological selves by killing
their abusers, some women opt for the latter.107
Yet another theory suggests that the battered woman who
kills her abuser is insane. It describes the battered woman's psy-
chological state as so distorted by the abuse that she suffers from
an impaired mental condition that causes her to kill her abuser.1
08
This approach stresses that battered women often suffer from
perceptual distortions, are themselves prone to violence, and suffer
from mental health problems linked to the abuse.'0 9 The fact that
a woman may not realize she has killed the abuser, or remember
doing so, is also emphasized."10 The homicidal act is thus attrib-
uted to a state of "borderline psychosis""'l that prevents the wo-
man from viewing her options accurately, or that drives the
woman to desperate actions.1' 2
Overall, Walker's theory of battered woman syndrome has
served as a springboard for other explanations of women's psycho-
logical and behavioral responses to domestic abuse. While none of
these theories directly contradict her observations, they modify
some of her characterizations, further explore some factors, and
cite additional factors that may affect a woman's response to
abuse.
106. Id. (quoting HEINz KoHuT, THE RESTORATION OF THE SELF (1977)).
107. Id. (concluding that such women "tak[e] what they perceive to be the only
avenue of self-assertion open to them. They kill their batterers").
Ewing also draws a link between learned helplessness, suicide, and homicide.
He recounts studies indicating that a feeling of helplessness typically accompanies
intense depression preceding suicide, and further notes that some of the homicidal
battered women in Walker's study were prepared to kill themselves when they
killed their batterers instead. Id. at 66-70 (citing WALKER, supra note 21, at 40).
Ewing posits that in such cases, the woman's "helplessness and depression have led
her to see no viable alternatives other than suicide and homicide"; she commits
homicide to protect her psychological self as well as her physical self. Id. at 70.
Other commentators criticize the "ontological insecurity" theory on the ground
that it is not in the "mainstream" of clinical or research psychology, nor does it
comport with any legal doctrine of justification or excuse. See, e.g., David L.
Faigman, Discerning Justice When Battered Women Kill, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 207,
221 (1987).
108. Rocco C. Cipparone, Jr., Comment, The Defense of Battered Women Who
Kill, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 427, 440-41 (1987).
109. Id. at 441.
110. Id. See also supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that several wo-
men examined by Walker could not recall certain aspects of killing their abusers).
111. Cipparone, supra note 108, at 441-42 (quoting an Illinois mental health
official).
112. Id. at 440.
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II. Using Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence with a Self-Defense
Strategy in Minnesota
The case in the Introduction described the trial of a battered
woman who responded to abuse by killing her abuser. Her defense
counsel argued justification and, alternatively, excuse. Although
neither approach was successful in that particular case, an under-
standing of both doctrines is necessary to determine the best de-
fense strategy available to women accused of killing their abusers.
The doctrines of justification and excuse represent the crimi-
nal justice system's attempt to evaluate intentionalist and deter-
minist behavior." 3 An otherwise illegal act is justified when
"society decides that the act was preferable to all alternative con-
duct available under the circumstances. 11 4 Under this view,
which underpins the doctrine of self-defense, the person commit-
ting the act was not responsible for the circumstances justifying
the act." 5
In contrast, a person is excused for committing an illegal act
if the actor is not blameworthy under the circumstances." 6 This
approach excuses conduct not because it was justified, but because
the actor is not culpable due to her unique mental state." 7 Thus,
while justification involves an objective standard (reasonableness),
excuse requires a subjective standard (the condition of the
defendant)."18
The tension between the doctrines of justification and excuse
becomes evident when comparing the different legal explanations
a battered woman might offer as a defense. Of the two ap-
proaches, battered woman syndrome evidence is most effective
when used to support a "justification" claim of self-defense. In
such cases in Minnesota, an expert witness may not testify to
whether the defendant suffers from the syndrome, but may only
give a general description of the syndrome and its characteristics.
Defense counsel may, however, present evidence from other
113. Intentionalism assumes that people have choices, and holds them responsi-
ble for their actions. Determinism, however, assumes that external forces are so
influential that a person is not responsible for her actions. For an excellent discus-
sion of justification and excuse in the intentionalist/determinist framework, see
Donald L. Creach, Note, Partially Determined Self-Defense: The Battered Wife
Kills and Tells Why, 34 STAN. L. REv. 615 (1982). See also Mather, supra note 12,
at 563-64 (explaining generally the differences between justification and excuse).
114. Creach, supra note 113, at 630-31.
115. Id. at 630-34.
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sources that indicates whether the defendant's characteristics con-
formed with those of a battered woman.
A. Self-Defense and Battered Woman Syndrome
As noted above, n 9 self-defense is a justification defense be-
cause it legitimizes the act, rather than the actor.' 20 A successful
claim of self-defense essentially "legalizes" the otherwise unlawful
act, in that the defendant is completely exonerated and allowed to
go free.' 2 ' To establish self-defense in Minnesota, the defendant
must show that:
a) she honestly believed she was in imminent danger of death
or great bodily harm,
b) this belief was reasonable under the circumstances, and
c) the amount of force she used was reasonable in light of the
danger apprehended. 12 2
Once the defendant raises a claim of self-defense, the state has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was
not justified.'2 3 This shifting of the burden of proof on the prose-
cutor and the possibility of complete exoneration makes the claim
particularly advantageous compared to excuse defenses.
1. Honest belief of imminent danger
For the defendant to successfully argue self-defense, she
must establish that she honestly feared she was in imminent dan-
ger of death or severe injury. "Imminent" does not necessarily
mean "immediate": customary abuse can create an honest fear of
imminent injury, even if the abuser was not immediately attacking
the woman.i24 Defense counsel should present expert testimony
about battered woman syndrome to show that the defendant hon-
estly believed she was in imminent danger of attack.'2 5 This testi-
mony should include information that abusive relationships go
through cycles of progressively severe violence, that battered wo-
men live in constant fear of attack from their abusers, and that
they are unable to leave their abusers for various external and
119. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
120. Creach, supra note 113, at 632.
121. See Mihajlovich, supra note 12, at 1271 (noting that "[a] successful justifica-
tion defense requires acquittal because, by definition, no crime has occurred").
122. See State v. Boyce, 170 N.W.2d 104, 111-12, 114 (Minn. 1969) (citations omit-
ted); State v. Sanford, 450 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
123. See State v. Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d 542, 548 (Minn. 1988).
124. CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JuSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DE-
FENSE, AND THE LAw 186-87 (1989); Lynn B. Rosewater, The Clinical and Court-
room Application of Battered Women's Personality Assessments, in DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 86, 92 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed. 1987);
125. Madison, supra note 22, at 1028-29.
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psychological reasons.l2 6
A battered woman has a good chance of convincing the jury
she held an honest belief that the decedent was about to attack her
if the evidence shows that the abuse was temporally imminent. In
many cases, however, the defendant may have killed the abuser
several hours or more after a violent attack. 127 In addition to
showing that the defendant was in constant fear of the defendant,
testimony about the syndrome can help establish that the woman's
close relationship with the abuser made her "hypersensitive" to vi-
olence and thus able to determine when extreme violence was
imminent.l28
2. Reasonable belief under the circumstances
Besides showing that she honestly believed she was in immi-
nent danger, the defendant must persuade the jury that her sub-
jective belief was reasonable.129 Again, expert testimony about
battered woman syndrome can help show that the defendant had a
reasonable belief of danger. The attacker's history of abuse, the
progressive cycle of violence, and threats of imminent abuse are all
relevant to the issue of reasonableness.l30 Moreover, testimony
that battered women are sensitive to impending attacks helps es-
126. Id. at 1029-30 (citations omitted).
127. See, e.g., Cipparone supra note 108, at 436 & nn.51-53; Madison, supra note
22, at 1031-32 (citing cases in which the defendant killed her abuser during a lull in
the physical abuse). The jury in Schabert II was apparently influenced by Regina
Schabert's admission to police that she killed her husband while he lay sleeping.
Schabert II, 24 N.W.2d at 847.
128. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. See, e.g., People v. Torres, 488
N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (1985) (noting that "[an expert]" would testify that a battered wo-
man, through her extensive experience with prolonged physical abuse, learns to
distinguish between varying degrees of danger of violence;" this testimony "would
provide a basis for the jury to understand how at the time of the shooting [the
abuser's] violence had, in the defendant's mind, passed from the 'normal' and toler-
able into the 'abnormal' and life-threatening"). See also Madison, supra note 22, at
1032 & n.40 (citing cases in which the jury heard evidence that battered women are
particularly sensitive to impending violence).
129. See State v. Sanford, 450 N.W.2d 580, 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (observing
that "imperfect self-defense," or a subjective, good faith belief that an objectively
unreasonable killing was reasonable, is not recognized as a defense in Minnesota).
130. Gillespie emphasizes that syndrome testimony is important because "a bat-
tered woman, by definition, lives with a man who has repeatedly demonstrated his
willingness to inflict pain on her and his ability to do so." GILLESPIE, supra note
124, at 124-25. She concludes that
[w]hen the man who has proved himself to be so brutal, so inexorable
in his cruelty, begins to assault her yet again, it is hard to imagine that
anyone could doubt the genuineness and reasonableness of her fear or
question whether her belief that she is about to be seriously injured
yet again is a reasonable belief.
Id. at 127. See also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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tablish that the defendant reasonably believed she was threatened
by imminent injury.131
Although syndrome testimony helps establish that the de-
fendant reasonably believed she was in fear of an imminent attack,
some juries have nevertheless rejected self-defense in cases where
the evidence shows that the defendant was not threatened by a
temporally imminent attack.132 In response, some commentators
have proposed relaxing the imminence requirement133 or eliminat-
ing it entirely.34 Other scholars, however, fear that such a modifi-
cation would lead to "routine" acquittals for women who
anticipatorially kill their batterers, and would encourage women
to rely on violence rather than outside intervention to end abusive
relationships.' 35
3. Reasonable degree of force
The woman must also show that her response to the threat
was reasonable. 13 6 In particular, the defendant must explain to
the jury why she did not leave the abuser, or choose a less injuri-
ous alternative such as retreat, instead of killing him.137 If the de-
131. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (noting that battered women are
extraordinarily sensitive to impending violence from their abusers).
132. See, e.g., State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Minn. 1988) (defendant con-
victed of second-degree felony murder for shooting her husband while he slept).
133. See GILLESPIE, supra note 124, at 185-87.
134. See, e.g., Maria L. Marcus, CONJUGAL VIOLENCE: THE LAW OF FORCE AND
THE FORCE OF LAw, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1657, 1730 (1981) (addressing the argument that
"judges in domestic homicide cases should provide a modified instruction on self-
defense, replacing the imminent danger requirement with the certainty of harm in
the future").
135. See ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAw 148 (1984) (observing
that "feminists ... are not convinced that a major weakening of the imminent-dan-
ger rule is necessarily advisable"). Although a battered woman may be forced to
rely on violence because she lacks the resources to escape, some battered women
are able to leave their abusers. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (citing
Walker's discussion of "ins" and "outs"). Assuming that "vigilante justice" is bad,
and that it is better for a battered woman to leave the abuser rather than kill him,
providing all battered women a broad right to retaliate against their abusers would
not be good public policy. TONG, supra, at 148-49.
136. See State v. Boyce, 170 N.W.2d 104, 112, 116 (Minn. 1969) (holding that the
defendant's "election to shoot" or "election to kill" must be reasonable in light of
the anticipated danger).
137. Ordinarily the defendant "must retreat to avoid danger, if reasonably possi-
ble." State v. Kaul, 457 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (citing State v. Mor-
gan, 296 N.W.2d 397, 402 (Minn. 1980)). In Minnesota, this duty applies even in
cases where the attack occurs in the defendant's own home. State v. Hennum, 428
N.W.2d 859, 866 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 441 N.W.2d 793
(Minn. 1989).
In the context of a battered woman's defense, counsel must explain why the
defendant remained in the abusive relationship. See GILLESPIE, supra note 124, at
145-46 (maintaining that "[e]xplaining to a jury why many battered women don't
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fendant used a weapon to kill the abuser when he was unarmed,
she must also persuade the jury that her resort to armed force was
reasonable under the circumstances. 3 8
Syndrome testimony helps explain why the woman was un-
able to leave the abuser. 3 9 The testimony should emphasize the
complexity of the battered woman's situation, and the external
and psychological forces that trap her in the abusive relation-
ship.' 40 The defendant's previously unsuccessful attempts to leave
the abuser should be presented, as well as the abuser's efforts to
keep the woman from abandoning the relationship.14' Defense
counsel should also present evidence about the impossibility of re-
treat under the circumstances of the defendant's decision to attack
the abuser.' 42
Defense counsel can also emphasize several factors indicating
that the degree of force used by the defendant was reasonable.
When applicable, the jury should hear evidence of the relative dis-
parity in strength and size between the parties, 43 that the defend-
ant had no training in the use of firearms or fending off
attackers,144 and that resisting with less than deadly force was
leave their husbands and, specifically, why this battered woman didn't leave her
husband can be one of the most crucial and difficult tasks in the defense of a wo-
man who kills her violent mate") (emphasis in original).
138. The traditional rule is that the use of deadly force against nondeadly force
is per se unreasonable. See Mather, supra note 12, at 564. Although the rule
against deadly force is no longer as strict, in many cases juries have rejected the
self-defense claims of women who used weapons against their unarmed attackers.
See, e.g., People v. White, 414 N.E.2d 196 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (woman who shot her
husband after he beat her convicted of voluntary manslaughter); State v. Hennum,
441 N.W.2d 793, 795 (Minn. 1989) (woman who shot her unarmed husband after he
beat her convicted of second-degree murder); State v. Patri, No. 78-187-CR (Wis. Ct.
App. Dec. 19, 1980) (LEXIS, States Library, Wis. file) (woman who shot her hus-
band in the back after he physically and sexually abused her convicted of
manslaughter).
139. See supra notes 42-52, 73-82 and accompanying text.
140. Id.
141. See Elizabeth Bochnak, Case Preparation and Development, in WOMEN'S
SELF DEFENSE CASES 41, 47 (Elizabeth Bochnak ed. 1981).
142. Id. (suggesting that such factors as the layout of the house, the weather, the
time of day (or night), what the defendant was wearing, whether the defendant had
money, whether she had keys to an automobile or the house, whether there were
children in the house, and whether the abuser threatened her or others with injury
if she left are relevant).
143. Mather, supra note 12, at 565 (observing that "when evaluating self-defense
claims, the modern trend is to consider the respective size of the parties, their sex,
the particularly violent nature of the attack, and the attacker's reputation for vio-
lence or violent history").
144. See State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558 (Wash. 1977) (recognizing that "[iln
our society women suffer from a conspicuous lack of access to training in and the
means of developing those skills necessary to effectively repel a male assailant
without resorting to the use of deadly weapons"); Mather, supra note 12, at 565
1991] BATERED WOMAN SYNDROME EVIDENCE 127
only likely to inflame the abuser.45 Overall, the jury should be
left with the impression that the defendant and her abuser became
equal adversaries only when the defendant obtained a weapon.14
Even with battered woman syndrome evidence, however, the
reasonableness requirement may prevent a successful claim of self-
defense. 147 Many commentators note that traditional self-defense
doctrine presumes a single encounter in public between adversa-
ries of approximately equal strength.148 These commentators thus
criticize the standard as representative of the male viewpoint only,
and propose changing the standard of reasonableness in cases in-
volving battered women and self-defense. 149
One proposal is to adopt an individualized gender-neutral
standard of reasonable force: to inquire whether "this [defendant]
act[ed] in a manner that was reasonable for this individual."150
Unlike the "reasonable man" or "reasonable person" standard, the
gender-neutral standard would not be slanted to the general male
viewpoint. Rather, the individual characteristics of the particular
defendant would serve as a yardstick for reasonableness, rather
than a corruptible "objective" standard of reasonableness.151
An individualized gender-neutral standard is criticized on the
ground that it might lead to sexual stereotyping, as it "run[s] the
(noting that "[women] are not trained to use their bodies to fight or defend them-
selves, nor do they learn to take blows"). See also GILLESPIE, supra note 124, at 92
(questioning whether "[a] woman who, terrified, unfamiliar with firearms, having
no confidence in her ability to hit the broad side of a barn, starts firing and doesn't
stop until the gun is empty" should be faced with a homicide conviction).
It is worth noting that Regina Schabert went hunting with her husband regu-
larly and was quite knowledgeable about firearms. Record at 389-90, 392-94, 450-51,
Schabert II.
145. Mather, supra note 12, at 565.
146. See GITLFESPIE, supra note 124, at 185.
147. See, e.g., State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Minn. 1989) (jury found de-
fendant guilty of second-degree felony murder for shooting batterer while he slept).
148. See GILLESPIE, supra note 124, at 4-6; Mihajlovich, supra note 12, at 1257.
This presumption does not accurately reflect a battered woman's situation. See
supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
149. See Mather, supra note 12, at 569-71 (observing that the entire self-defense
doctrine revolves around the male concept of a "fair fight," and that courts typi-
cally fail to point out to juries that "what is deemed to be reasonable for a man may
not be so for a woman (and vice-versa)"); Faigman, supra note 107, at 226 (main-
taining that "the existing [self-defense] doctrine's myopic vision of the justifiable
use of force-a vision informed exclusively by male stereotypes of reasonableness-
must be reexamined").
A related argument recounts the historical development of the notion that a
man could kill his wife under certain conditions, but a woman killing her husband
was as serious as killing the king. Mihajlovich, supra note 12, at 1256. Remnants of
this policy are found in existing legal doctrines and media coverage of domestic vio-
lence. See id. at 1256-57.
150. Mather, supra note 12, at 571.
151. Id.
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risk of emphasizing the weaknesses and idiosyncracies of the fe-
male sex in general and the battered woman in particular." 5 2
This criticism, however, can be addressed with reference to the
"women as survivors" scholarship. For example, rather than char-
acterizing a battered woman's inability to leave as arising out of
weakness, an individualized gender-neutral standard could empha-
size that her choices were limited by her role in the battering rela-
tionship and society, and that her behavior was part of a survival
strategy.153 Moreover, if the standard were available to everyone,
it would allow men and women alike to emphasize the individual
characteristics that made deadly force necessary. This would re-
duce the risk that women as a group would be perceived as weak.
Another proposal calls for an entirely new defense based on
the battered woman syndrome. 154 This defense would require that
the defendant show she fits the profile of a battered woman, that
her relationship with the decedent fits the general pattern of the
syndrome, and that she acted as a "reasonable battered woman" in
killing her abuser.' 55 The most significant criticism of this propo-
sal is that it might violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.15 Classifications based on gender are subject
to heightened constitutional scrutiny: the classification must serve
an important state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieving
that interest.157 Because the "reasonable battered woman" stan-
dard would necessarily exclude males, it would be subject to
heightened scrutiny.158 Although it is important that women have
their conduct judged fairly, the courts would be more likely to find
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 55-61, 73-82 and accompanying text.
154. Mather, supra note 12, at 571. See also Michael A. Buda & Teresa L. But-
ler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence, 10
Soc. ACTION & L. 63, 67 (1984) (advocating such an approach).
155. Mather, supra note 12, at 571-72.
156. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
"nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to
state judicial action. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
157. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In Craig, a law forbidding the sale
of beer to males between the ages of 18-21, but not females, was struck down as
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that statistics showing a
disproportionate number of males ages 18-21 drove while intoxicated were insuffi-
cient support for the discriminatory law, and that the state had non-discriminatory
means of achieving its interest in public safety. Id.
158. A "reasonable battered woman" standard is facially discriminatory. Besides
generally depriving men of its benefits, the standard may violate the rights of the
victim by providing the defendant with a "right of retaliation [which is] protected
by a sexually discriminatory defense." Steven D. Rittenmeyer, Of Battered Wives,
Self-Defense and Double Standards of Justice, 9 J. CRIM. JUST. 389, 395 (1981).
[Vol. 10:107
1991] BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME EVIDENCE 129
the individualized gender-neutral standard to be a less discrimina-
tory alternative. 5 9
Other proposals include creating a "reasonable woman" stan-
dard or a defense of "psychological self-defense." Although the
"reasonable woman" standard has the advantage of being accessi-
ble to all women, it still suffers from the criticism that it might
perpetuate stereotypes and violate equal protection.1o Moreover,
the standard may be unwieldy, because the current standard of
reasonableness is so influenced by the male perspective that "[w]e
do not have a working concept of female objectivity untainted by
the male viewpoint."'161 Finally, "psychological self-defense" has
been dismissed as esoteric and unmanageable.162 Despite its short-
159. There is little doubt, of course, that the "reasonable man" standard is also a
slanted measurement. The Washington Supreme Court specifically recognized this
in State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 559 (Wash. 1977) (maintaining that "[u]ntil such
time as the effects of... history are eradicated, care must be taken to assure ...
our self-defense instructions afford women the right to have their conduct judged
in light of the individual . . handicaps which are the product of sex discrimina-
tion"). As such, the "reasonable man" standard presumably violates women's equal
protection rights, especially in self-defense cases. Mather, supra note 12, at 572 &
n.218. Nevertheless, this argument, while forceful, does not explain why the courts
should substitute one discriminatory standard for another. Id.
Another criticism of a "reasonable battered woman" standard is that, like the
gender-neutral standard, a "reasonable battered woman" standard might reinforce
stereotypes about women in general and battered women in particular. Id. Also,
the proposed standard would force battered women to fit into a "pigeonhole of the
typical battering relationship," as the defense would be unavailable to her if either
she or her relationship with the abuser did not closely follow characteristics of the
syndrome. Id. The first problem can be dealt with in the same manner as the gen-
der-neutral standard: that the battered woman's behavior can be explained as sur-
vival, rather than helplessness or hysteria. As for the second problem, the
traditional self-defense standard would still be available to women who suffered
abuse but did not fit the battered woman defense.
Finally, it is worth noting that at least one response to the argument that a
gender-neutral standard provides a "less discriminatory alternative" is that a less
discriminatory alternative is not necessarily better. After all, battered woman syn-
drome, like rape, is most commonly manifested with an assault by a man against a
woman. If battered woman syndrome is not a gender-neutral problem, one won-
ders why the courts should seek a gender-neutral solution.
160. Mather, supra note 12, at 573. The equal protection problem arises with a
separate standard for men and women. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying
text. One response to this criticism is that women and men should not be subject to
the same standard of reasonableness because they are not "similarly situated": wo-
men have historically suffered from discrimination, are physically different, and
are discouraged from learning and relying on male self-defense tactics. Elizabeth
M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Them-
selves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, in WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES,
supra note 141, at 1, 18.
161. Mather, supra note 12, at 573.
162. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 107, at 224 (arguing that "[proponents of the
defense] make no attempt whatsoever to provide specific criteria to enable a fact-
finder to discern when one battered woman kills justly and another kills
unjustly").
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comings, self-defense is a viable defense option for women accused
of killing their abusers, as it justifies their conduct and results in
acquittal. Expert testimony about battered woman syndrome and
evidence about the defendant's particular circumstances can
counter much of the inherent male bias in current self-defense
doctrine. Beyond the current self-defense framework, an individu-
alized gender-neutral standard of reasonableness is the best alter-
native to the traditional "objective" standard because it takes the
battered woman's individual circumstances into account without
creating equal protection problems.
B. Impaired Mental State Defenses and Battered Woman
Syndrome
The doctrine of excuse, which does not excuse the actor's
conduct but rather the actor herself, is represented by defenses
that claim the defendant was acting under an impaired mental
state. These defenses range from insanity, which totally excuses
the conduct, to partial responsibility defenses such as "heat of pas-
sion" or "diminished capacity." Although battered woman syn-
drome evidence can be used to support these defenses, the
defenses themselves provide incomplete protection, and thus are
not as appealing as self-defense. In addition, the diminished capac-
ity defense is not available in Minnesota. 63
1. Insanity
Minnesota follows the M'Naughten test for insanity: the de-
fendant is not excused unless she was "laboring under such a de-
fect of reason ...as not to know the nature of the act, or that it
was wrong."164 Battered woman syndrome, as well as other evi-
dence of severe abuse, was initially used to establish that the de-
fendant was legally insane at the time she killed her abuser.165 An
insanity defense should stress the history of physical and psycho-
logical abuse suffered by the woman. Ultimately, the defense
should "suggest that the woman was driven to the breaking point
163. See infra note 181.
164. See MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (1990). See also State v. Lindberg, 408 N.W.2d
589, 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). This test is more narrow than the alternative "irre-
sistible impulse" test for insanity. For a discussion of the difference between the
two tests, see State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1317-18 (N.J. 1990).
States may choose for themselves which insanity test to apply in their criminal
justice system. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952). Whether Minne-
sota should retain or abandon the M'Naughten test is outside the scope of this
paper.
165. See Schneider & Jordan, supra note 160, at 1, 5.
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by the circumstances of her situation."'' 6
An insanity defense based on battered woman syndrome is
usually viewed as unacceptable for several reasons. First, unlike a
claim of self-defense, the defendant has the ultimate burden of
persuading the jury she is insane.167 This means that the pre-
sumption is initially against the defendant, and that she, not the
state, must satisfy the elements of the defense. Second, juries are
generally suspicious of the defense, and may not be convinced that
the defendant is legally insane unless she appears truly de-
ranged.168 Third, even if successful, an insanity defense does not
exonerate the woman, nor does it necessarily gain her freedom.
Although she is not incarcerated if acquitted by reason of insanity,
she may be committed to a mental hospital for a period of time ex-
ceeding any time she would have served if found guilty of the
crime.169 Finally, the insanity defense helps perpetuate the stereo-
type that battered women are insane. This contradicts recent
scholarship suggesting that battered women act logically and rea-
sonably given their situations.' 70
2. Heat of passion
A reduced charge of manslaughter based on evidence of prov-
ocation might also be an option in a case involving a battered wo-
man. A person commits first-degree' 7 ' or second-degree172 murder
by killing another without provocation and with intent to effect
the other's death.173 A lesser charge of manslaughter, however, is
applicable if the actor was provoked into a "heat of passion" that
166. Cipparone, supra note 108, at 440 (quoting Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan
B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Phys-
ical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 149, 160 (1978)).
167. State v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1990); DeMars v. State, 352
N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 1984).
168. See Schneider & Jordan, supra note 160, at 31.
169. See id. at 29.
170. See supra notes 73-82, 129-46 and accompanying text.
171. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1990) which states, in pertinent part:
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of MURDER in the first
degree and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life:
(1) causes the death of a human being with premeditation and with in-
tent to effect the death of the person or of another...
(emphasis added).
172. See MINN. STAT. § 609.19 (1990) which states, in pertinent part:
Whoever does... the following is guilty of MURDER in the SECOND
DEGREE and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40
years:
(1) Causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death
of that person or another, but without premeditation ...
(emphasis added).
173. Under certain circumstances, both statutes also punish killings that are not
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precipitated the killing.174 Evidence of battered woman syndrome
might be used to show that the defendant was repeatedly subjected
to recurring abuse and was ultimately provoked by a particularly
severe battering incident. The utility of this approach is limited,
however, as it merely reduces the severity of the crime for which
the defendant is charged, rather than exonerating her com-
pletely.s7 5 It is therefore a less attractive option than self-defense.
3. Diminished capacity
Another avenue to a reduced charge of manslaughter, avail-
able in some states, might be a defense of "diminished capacity."
This defense may be available if the defendant suffered from an
"abnormal mental condition" while committing the crime. 7 6 Like
a defense of provocation, this defense reduces the severity level of
the offense to manslaughter, as it establishes that the defendant
did not have the requisite intent for murder.177
As with insanity, evidence of battered woman syndrome can
be introduced to show that the woman committed the crime under
a diminished mental state. In particular, the defense should focus
on the intense anger the battered woman felt at the time of the
killing.178 The oppressive social context should also be revealed as
a source of anger.179 Overall, under this defense, the homicidal act
is presented as an irrational attempt to "fight back" prompted by
severe physical and psychological abuse and social injustice.18 0
Like the other impaired mental state defenses, this approach
has several weaknesses. First and most important, diminished ca-
pacity is not available as a defense in Minnesota.' 8 ' This obviously
necessarily intentional. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(2), (5), (6) (1990); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.19(2) (1990).
174. See MINN. STAT. § 609.20 (1990) which states that a person commits man-
slaughter if he or she "[i]ntentionally causes the death of another person in the
heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a per-
son of ordinary self-control under like circumstances." Id.
175. Note that a person convicted of first-degree manslaughter may be impris-
oned for up to 15 years. MINN. STAT. § 609.20 (1990).
176. See Randolph, supra note 43, at 25-26.
177. Id. at 26. Randolph views this defense as more attractive than an insanity
defense because it shifts the burden of proof to the prosecution, and because it re-
sults in a relatively short incarceration period rather than a lengthy commitment.
Id.
178. See id. at 24-25.
179. See id. at 25, 26-27; see also supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
180. Randolph, supra note 43, at 25. It should be noted that Randolph advocates
changing the diminished capacity defense itself for battered women, so that their
actions are not seen as the result of psychological abnormalities, but as a logical re-
sponse to their situations. See id. at 26.
181. State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982). See also State v. Neit-
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undercuts the utility of the defense. Second, even if it were avail-
able, the defense shares the same disadvantage as a "heat of pas-
sion" defense: it is incomplete, as it results not in acquittal, but in
incarceration.18 2 Third, as with insanity, the defense furthers ste-
reotypes that a battered woman's responses are illogical.l8 3 The
diminished capacity defense is thus relatively unappealing.
Because of their relative ineffectiveness and negative social
implications, the impaired mental state defenses should be relied
upon only as a last resort.'84 Although not perfect, self-defense is
usually the best defense strategy for a battered woman accused of
killing her abuser.
C Evidentiary Issues in Self-Defense Cases
When a female defendant attempts to introduce battered wo-
man syndrome evidence to bolster a claim of self-defense, the
court must decide whether expert testimony regarding the syn-
drome is admissible under existing tests under common law and
evidentiary rules. Minnesota courts apply the three-part test set
forth in Dyas v. United States 185: the subject matter must be "be-
yond the ken of the average layman," the expert witness must be
sufficiently versed in the area so that the testimony will aid the
trier of fact, and the state of the scientific knowledge must allow
the expert to articulate a well-founded opinion.' 86 In applying the
third part of the Dyas test, Minnesota courts generally rely on the
standard in Frye v. United States 187 that the body of knowledge
upon which the expert's opinion is based must be generally ac-
cepted by the scientific community to which the witness
belongs.' 88
Besides meeting standards specific to expert testimony, the
zel, No. C8-89-1229, 1990 WL 28051 (Minn. Ct. App. March 20, 1990); State v.
Patnoude, No. C9-89-1045, 1990 WL 3322 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1990) (holding
that evidence of diminished capacity can be used for sentencing purposes).
182. See Randolph, supra note 43, at 26. Randolph asserts that ideally the "femi-
nist theory of diminished capacity" will not lead to incarceration. She does not,
however, explain how successfully pleading her conception of the defense will lead
to a different result than the traditional diminished capacity claim.
183. Id. at 25.
184. See Schneider & Jordan, supra note 160, at 29 & n.90.
185. 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977) (quoting McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 13, at 29-31
(Edward W. Cleary, 2d. ed. 1992)).
186. Id. at 832. The Minnesota Supreme Court applied the Dyas-like test in
State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798-99 (Minn. 1989). See also Madison, supra
note 22, at 1046 n.93.
187. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
188. Id. at 1014. See State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798-99 (Minn. 1989);
Madison, supra note 22, at 1046 n.93.
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proffered evidence must meet relevancy standards. The expert
testimony must be "logically" relevant: it must tend to prove the
proposition it is offered to prove.'8 9 The testimony must also be
"legally" relevant: its probative value must not be outweighed by
the risk of prejudicing or confusing the jury, nor must the evi-
dence be overly cumulative19i
Expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome may
be general evidence describing the syndrome, or specific evidence
addressing whether a particular defendant suffers from the syn-
drome.i 9 ' Some courts hold that general testimony regarding bat-
tered woman syndrome is irrelevant unless the expert testifies
that the defendant suffered from the syndrome at the time of the
killing.192 Other courts force the defendant to submit to an ad-
verse psychological examination if she presents expert testimony,
based on a psychological examination, that she suffers from bat-
tered woman syndrome.' 93
In Minnesota, testimony about battered woman syndrome has
been held to be helpful to the jury, and research about the syn-
drome is recognized as generally accepted by the scientific commu-
nity.' 94 A qualified expert witness may therefore testify generally
about the syndrome. Defense counsel may not, however, present
expert testimony that the defendant suffered from the syndrome,
nor may the court order an adverse psychological examination of
the defendant.195 Rather, both sides are limited to presenting tes-
timony from lay witnesses regarding the defendant's characteris-
tics that correspond to, or conflict with, battered woman
syndrome.196
189. See MINN. R. EVID. 401.
190. See MINN. R. EVID. 403.
191. See Madison, supra note 22, at 1036.
192. See id. at 1036-37 & nn.53-57 for cases cited.
193. Id. at 1042-43 (citing New Hampshire and Missouri cases).
194. See State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 797-99 (Minn. 1989).
195. Id. at 799. The court apparently restricted the defendant to general testi-
mony about the syndrome to avoid the need for an adverse examination of the de-
fendant. Madison, supra note 22, at 1047 & n.97 (citing Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at
799). The court also wanted to leave the question of whether the defendant suf-
fered from the syndrome for the jury. Id. at 1047 & n.98.
196. See id. This formulation has been criticized as illogical and contrary to
well-established evidentiary rules. See Madison, supra note 22, at 1048, 1049-61.
Note that if the defendant wishes to use evidence of battered woman syndrome
to support a claim of insanity, the State is entitled to an adverse examination of the
defendant. See MINN. R. Ciuim. P. 20.02; Madison, supra note 22, at 1038-39 & n.64.
Thus, in an insanity defense, the defendant is presumably allowed to present testi-
mony from an expert witness that she suffers from the syndrome. See id. at 1047 &
n.97 (noting the Hennum court's decision to limit expert witness testimony regard-
ing battered woman syndrome to general matters in self-defense cases, on the
ground that this obviates the need for an adverse examination).
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Thus, assuming the expert witness is qualified, defense coun-
sel in Minnesota should have little trouble presenting general ex-
pert testimony about battered woman syndrome to bolster the
defendant's self-defense claim. The court will limit this testimony
to a general description of the syndrome, however, and will not
permit the expert to testify as to whether the defendant suffers
from the syndrome. Defense counsel must present other evidence
indicating that the defendant displays characteristics common to
the syndrome, and let the jury reach its own conclusion about
whether the defendant suffered from battered woman syndrome.
Conclusion
In the years since a jury convicted Regina Schabert for killing
her abuser, clinical and research scientists have advanced theories
to explain behavioral and psychological reactions of battered wo-
men to abuse. Walker's theories of the cycle of violence and
learned helplessness laid the groundwork for the way the scientific
community views battered women's responses today. Other theo-
rists expanded on Walker's views by placing her model of the abu-
sive relationship in its larger social and familial context, re-
defining women's perspectives of domestic abuse, and calling for
further scholarship to explain the female perspective. Still other
research has been directed at explaining why some women re-
spond to abuse by killing their abusers.
Minnesota courts use existing legal doctrines to give effect to
the findings that have come out of the scientific community. Con-
temporary theories regarding battered women make a self-defense
claim the best defense strategy for women accused of murdering
their abusers. Because the realities of the syndrome have not al-
ways fit traditional self-defense doctrine, however, some commen-
tators have proposed altering some aspects of the doctrine to make
it more accessible to women generally and battered women specifi-
cally. Although Minnesota has not modified its self-defense doc-
trine, it has adopted an evidentiary rule that limits expert
testimony regarding battered woman syndrome to a general de-
scription of the syndrome, thereby relieving the defendant of the
need to submit to an adverse psychiatric examination.
One cannot say with certainty that had evidence of battered
woman syndrome been available, Regina Schabert would have
gone free. Recent cases indicate that while battered woman syn-
drome evidence may be helpful, it does not guarantee acquittal. It
is also unknown whether existing self-defense doctrine will be
modified to incorporate new scientific findings. Nevertheless, the
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study of domestic violence and battered women has led to an ex-
tensive re-examination of established legal doctrines and the social
institutions they help preserve.
